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Foreword 
The past 12 months have provided both good news and 
bad for Scotlands economy  economic growth has 
picked up during 2018, but overall growth remains low. 
One reason for the low growth is a lack of productivity 
growth.
This mix of fortunes is also evident in the latest of 
Deloittes Power Up reports, Power Up: UK-Wide Growth. 
It showed that Scotlands economy has only grown at 
around half the UK average rate and while the country has 
outperformed the UK average in productivity growth over 
the last 10 years, productivity growth remains low. 
The latest Power-Up report looked at many years of 
employment and productivity data to help identify where 
Scotland can maximise opportunities by learning from the 
past, before combining this with the very real experiences 
and views of current business leaders, educators, local 
government officials and other stakeholders.
One of the findings is that Scotlands businesses need to 
collaborate further with educators and policymakers to 
develop the vital skills required to harness productivity 
for regional growth. Another key finding is that Scotlands 
business leaders will need to remain open and agile to 
transformational opportunities, as digital strategies and 
technology innovation continue to influence productivity 
gains in the short term. 
Our report also highlighted that Scotland needs more 
businesses of scale that are competitively positioned 
across international markets. 
Scotland can grow these businesses.  Innovation and 
entrepreneurialism are embedded in Scotlands roots, 
standing businesses in good stead to respond to the 
challenges ahead. This was reflected in the recent Summit 
Entrepreneurship Awards which Deloitte was proud to 
sponsor once again. 
Like many before them, this years finalists demonstrated 
exceptional leadership skills. Their vision and 
commitment, combined with ongoing investment in their 
people, technology and other assets, has ensured they 
continue to run strong, sustainable businesses which can 
adapt to ever-changing marketplaces.
As we face the challenges ahead including the continuing 
uncertainty around Brexit, it is important that business 
leaders in Scotland continue to plan for the future. 
Similarly, it is important not to lose sight of the importance 
of announcements such as the upcoming Scottish Budget, 
detailing the Scottish Governments spending and tax 
plans for the year ahead.
The Scottish Governments use of income tax powers has 
certainly been the main focus of recent Scottish Budgets, 
and with the announcement in Octobers UK Budget that 
the Chancellor intends to raise the higher rate threshold 
to £50,000, from April next year, it is likely to dominate 
once again.  
Scotlands Finance Secretary, Derek Mackay, has 
indicated he does not intend to match this for Scottish 
income tax bands, which apply to earnings and pensions 
for Scottish residents, and that will result in a noticeable 
difference in the tax paid between Scotlands higher rate 
tax payers and those in the rest of the UK.  
What impact this will have on investment and growth in 
Scotland is the subject of much debate. However, it is 
important that Scotland is seen as an attractive place for 
people and businesses.  We have an ageing population, 
a shrinking working age population and it is vital for our 
future that we do not deter people from choosing to come 
to Scotland. 
There are no easy answers to how to improve Scotlands 
productivity growth, our economic growth or how to 
balance the nations books. As the countrys business 
landscape continues to evolve, it will be important for 
all leaders to think innovatively and plan differently, to 
identify solutions from which everyone can benefit.
John Macintosh 
Tax Partner
Deloitte
December 2018
Deloitte supports the production of the Fraser Economic Commentary. It has no control over its editorial content, 
including in particular the Institutes economic forecasts.
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The vote on the UKs EU Withdrawal Agreement will 
be one of the most significant in a generation. It 
has the potential to shape the future of the UK and 
Scottish economies for decades to come.
Whatever happens, it will not mark the end of the 
uncertainty. A vote in favour will see the UK enter 
a near two-year transition process. But the most 
challenging issue  a future UK-EU trade deal  has 
yet to be agreed.
Some will argue that a vote against will increase 
the likelihood of no-deal. Others argue that it 
provides a last opportunity to secure a softer 
Brexit.
In such times, any economic forecasts must come 
with major health warnings.
What we can say with some confidence however, 
is that no deal would be a substantial (negative) 
economic shock. The Bank of England have set out 
a worst-case scenario which could see the UK 
economy shrink by around 8% from 2019.
To put that in context, that is around double the 
size of the recession Scotland witnessed during 
the financial crisis. Whilst some people have 
questioned this analysis, even under a less 
disruptive no deal, the Banks analysis suggests 
that the slowdown could still be significant.
All this comes at a time when the Scottish economy 
had been showning signs of picking-up. Growth 
in Scotland for the first six months of 2018 had 
outperformed the UK as a whole.
In the event of a smooth Brexit with a full transition 
period, we expect growth to pick up. We have kept 
our forecasts broadly unchanged on September 
at 1.4% for 2019, followed by 1.5% for 2020 and 
1.4% for 2021.
Summary
Given the Brexit debate, the Scottish Governments 
upcoming Budget has received little attention.
But the government faces a number of decisions 
that will shape the direction of Scotlands public 
finances for years to come.
Will Mr Mackay choose to follow  at least in part 
 the decision by the Chancellor to raise the Higher 
Rate threshold on income tax? Or will he take a 
further decisive shift to differentiate Scottish and 
rUK income tax policy?
As a minority administration, what might be offered 
to secure parliamentary support? Will Scottish 
Green Party backing lead to a more fundamental 
look at the funding of local government?
And what is the long-term strategy for public 
services? With the NHS on track to soon account 
for around £1 of every £2 spent by the Scottish 
Government, pressures on other budgets continue 
to increase. We have heard a lot about plans for 
priority areas of spend, but what about other areas?
During the coming months of debate and 
negotiations, the Scottish budget will no doubt play 
second fiddle to Brexit. But we should not forget 
the importance of the budget, not only because it 
determines how much income and council tax we 
all pay, but because of what it will tell us about 
the long term outlook for public spending and tax 
competitiveness in Scotland.
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
December 2018
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At a glance
2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.4% 1.5% 1.4%
Production 1.6% 1.7% 1.6%
Construction 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
Services 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Table: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth (%), 2019  2021
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Chart: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth range
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 75.0% ź 3.8% ź
England 75.8% Ÿ 4.1% ź
Wales 75.0% Ÿ 3.9% ź
N. Ireland 68.5% Ÿ 4.1% -
UK 75.5% Ÿ 4.1% ź
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Outlook and Appraisal
Whilst economic growth in Scotland remains below trend, it has picked-up in 2018 to its fastest pace 
since 2014. However, businesses are increasingly nervous about the prospects for the UK and Scottish 
economies in the light of the looming Brexit impasse and the potential political crisis it could usher in.  
Chart 1: Scottish growth since 2013, year and quarter
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Table 1: UK labour market, Jul - Sep 2018
Employment 
(16-64)
Unemployment 
(16+)
Inactivity 
(16-64)
Scotland 75.0% 3.8% 22.0%
England 75.8% 4.1% 20.8%
Wales 75.0% 3.9% 21.9%
N. Ireland 68.5% 4.1% 28.5%
UK 75.5% 4.1% 21.2%
Source: ONS, LFS
Table 2: Change in Scottish GDP relative to baseline of full EU 
membership after 15 years
EEA FTA WTO
UK (2018)* -2.5% -6.7% -9.3%
SG (2018) -2.7% -6.1% -8.5%
FAI (2017) - -4.9% -7.5%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Introduction
As we outlined in our last Commentary, growth in the 
Scottish economy has picked up in recent times  
consistent with the forecast we set out this time last 
year. Chart 1. 
Whilst activity remains below trend, it has certainly 
been more positive than in recent times and has 
helped unemployment to remain at a near historical 
low. Table 1. 
But the outlook is dominated by one issue: Brexit. 
There remains a sense that no one knows where the 
ongoing political process will end: indeed, the range 
of outcomes seems as wide as ever. 
Forecasting any economic outlook in such times is 
IUDXJKWZLWKGLőFXOWLHV:HPDNHQRH[FXVHVIRU
VD\LQJWKDWZHFDQRŎHUOLWWOHFHUWDLQW\WRZKHUHWKH
economy might go in the months ahead. 
Whatever the outcome, it is far from apparent that 
the fog enveloping the near term outlook will roll 
away to reveal a clarity that has been starkly absent 
thus far. 
Indeed, many critical elements may simply be 
fudged, or more openly deferred, leaving uncertainty 
for many more months, if not years.
In such times, building resilience into plans for 
DQGEH\RQGLVSHUKDSVWKHPRVWHŎHFWLYH
strategy that can be undertaken at the current time 
by businesses. 
One of the most frustrating things about the Brexit 
debate  whether you agree or disagree with the 
decision  is that many important issues, such as 
this months Scottish Budget, are being side-lined. 
But the decisions that Mr Mackay will take on tax, 
public spending and economic policy, will shape the 
HFRQRPLFDQGŏVFDORXWORRNIRU\HDUVWRFRPH
It is therefore important that we continue to debate 
and critique the choices that will be made.
* Figures for the UK economy
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Table 3: OECD & EU quarterly growth rates: 2017 to 2018
2017 2018
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
UK 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.6
US 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.9
Japan 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.2 -0.2 0.7 -0.3
Canada 1.0 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5
Euro Area 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2
Germany 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.2
France 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.4
Italy 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0
Source: OECD 
Chart 2: Global manufacturing PMIs: falling back in recent 
months
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Chart 3: Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, 1997 - Oct 
2018
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The global economy
The global economy has been in robust health for 
over two years now. 
World GDP is estimated to have risen by 3.7 per 
cent in 2017, up from 3.2 per cent in 2016. The IMF 
forecast that it will remain at this  above trend  
level in 2018. 
However, as we highlighted in our last commentary, 
most economists believe that growth has peaked (at 
least in advanced economies). 
Indeed, there is growing evidence of a slowdown in 
many of Scotlands key trading partners. Table 3. In 
particular, output in the Euro Area rose by just 0.2% 
 a four year low  over the summer. 
6LJQLŏFDQWO\WKH*HUPDQHFRQRP\FRQWUDFWHGIRU
WKHŏUVWWLPHVLQFHGULYHQLQSDUWE\RQJRLQJ
challenges in car manufacturing, but also wider 
fragility in investment and household spending. 
Indicators of activity across the global economy have 
HDVHGEDFN&KDUW6RPHRIWKLVUHŐHFWVDQDWXUDO
change in the economic cycle. However, there are 
concerns that heightened political uncertainty could 
turn a soft-landing into something altogether more 
challenging. Chart 3. 
Chief amongst these are the potential impacts 
of rising trade tensions, led by the increasing 
protectionist policies of the Trump administration. 
World trade accelerated sharply in 2017  to grow at 
its fastest rate since 2011  but there are signs that 
this momentum is fading with recent trade disputes 
taking their toll.
Chart 4: Long-term impact of Brexit on Irelands GDP
-8%
-7%
-6%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
EEA CU FTA WTO
%
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 f
ro
m
 b
a
s
e
lin
e
 i
n
 2
0
3
0
Tariffs and customs
Regulatory divergence
Service barriers
Source: The Department of Business, Enterprise & 
Innovation (DBEI), Irish Government
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Chart 5: Stock market performance to Nov 2018, 2007 = 100
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Chart 6: Exchange rates, $/ to £, 2013 - Nov 2018
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
U
S
 $
/E
u
ro
 t
o
 G
B
P
US $ to GBP
Euro to GBP
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
Chart 7: Price of oil, 2013 - Nov 2018, US $/BBL
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Of course, Europe faces its own challenges from 
Brexit  nowhere more so than Ireland. Chart 4. 
The heightened risk around that global outlook has 
spilled over into renewed volatility in stock markets. 
Most major indices have seen falls in recent weeks. 
The FTSE 100 is down around 10% on its May 2018 
peak. Chart 5. Such volatility has some investors 
speculating that the worlds major central banks 
PD\SXWRŎSODQVWRWLJKWHQPRQHWDU\SROLF\
Closer to home, Sterling continues to trade at a 
discount, driven by concerns over the UKs long-run 
prospects post-Brexit. Chart 6.
The FT reported in November that investors have 
withdrawn more than $1tn from UK-focused equity 
IXQGVVLQFHWKHUHIHUHQGXPóWKHKLJKHVWRXWŐRZV
VLQFHWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
And in October, the UK market was rated the least 
popular of 22 asset classes among fund managers in 
a Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey. 
The price of oil has entered bear market territory. 
In just over a month, Brent has plunged by around 
30% to below $60. Chart 7. Whilst fears of a global 
slowdown have not helped, it is an oversupply that 
has had the greatest impact. 
This of course matters here in Scotland. The oil and 
JDVVHFWRUKDGMXVWFRPHWKURXJKDGLőFXOWSHULRG
ZLWKFRQŏGHQFHUHWXUQLQJ&KDUW
Whilst the low oil price will come as a blow to many, 
WKHPRRGLQWKHVHFWRUUHPDLQVFRQŏGHQWZLWKPRVW
contractors and operators better prepared for a 
lower break-even price. 
Chart 8: Optimism in North Sea , 2004 - May-Oct 2018
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Chart 9: UK economic growth compared to (best & worst) G7 
economies
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Chart 10: UK economic performance, 2008 - Q3 2018
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Chart 11: Post-referendum performance relative to pre- and 
post-referendum growth forecasts
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The UK economy
Following a period of relatively strong growth in 
2014 through 2016, the UK economy has slowed 
VLJQLŏFDQWO\RYHUWKHODVWFRXSOHRI\HDUV&KDUW
In late October, the OBR revised down their forecasts 
for GDP growth in 2018 to just 1.3%. Since then, 
ŏJXUHVKDYHVKRZQWKDWJURZWKSLFNHGXSRYHUWKH
summer (+0.6%), boosted in part by good weather, 
the World Cup and recovery in sectors which had 
experienced a challenging start to 2018. 
This recovery was particularly pronounced in 
construction, where output grew by over 2%. 
It is over a longer time horizon that a clearer picture 
of the true health of an economy can be assessed. 
This shows that even with these recent positive 
ŏJXUHV8.JURZWKUHPDLQVEHORZWUHQGZLWKDQQXDO
growth of 1.5%. Chart 10. 
It is therefore hard not to conclude that the ongoing 
Brexit uncertainty has had an impact.  The fall in the 
pound has squeezed household incomes. Business 
investment has arguably taken the biggest hit and 
has contracted now for three consecutive quarters. 
Of course, predicting where the economy would 
have been had a referendum not been called is 
IUDXJKWZLWKGLőFXOW\&KDUW
What we can at least conclude is that those who 
predicted a sharp recession immediately after 
June 2016 were wrong, but so too were those 
who suggested that leaving the EU would have no 
negative impact. Chart 12.
Chart 12: Weaker productivity forecasts for UK for next 5 years
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Chart 13: Productivity performance pre and post financial crisis 
in G7
0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%
Italy
Canada
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Japan
United States
Growth of labour productivity per hour worked
Average growth, 1997-2007 Average growth, 2008-2018
Source: ONS & OECD
Chart 14: OBR forecasts for the UK unemployment rate: currently 
overly pessimistic
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Chart 15:  Output gap estimates, Q1 2008 - Q2 2018
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Interestingly, much of the explanation why both 
WKH%DQNRI(QJODQGDQGWKH2őFHIRU%XGJHW
Responsibility remain relatively pessimistic about 
the outlook for the UK economy is not driven by 
short-term factors, such as Brexit uncertainty 
or even a more fragile and volatile global policy 
environment. 
Instead, it is driven by continued weak productivity. 
It is this, more than anything else that is holding 
back growth forecasts.
,WLVHDV\WRVHHZK\WKHJRYHUQPHQWöVRőFLDO
forecasters continue to take a much more 
pessimistic outlook for productivity given recent 
performance. Productivity across developed 
economies is much lower than pre-crisis but the 
GURSRŎLQWKH8.LVSDUWLFXODUO\SURQRXQFHG&KDUW
13. 
At the same time however, the labour market 
continues to perform much better than expected, 
with unemployment consistently beating forecasts  
Chart 14. Indeed, there are increasing signs of skills 
shortages and rising vacancies across sectors. 
Taken together, the outlook for productivity and 
the labour market, means that there seems to be 
little spare capacity to help growth pick-up beyond 
current levels  Chart 15. Most forecasts predict 
that the UK is operating at close to its potential or 
sustainable level (the output gap). 
It also means that whilst real earnings have started 
to rise once again, the prospects for a substantial 
pick-up in take-home pay appear remote. For many 
households, the feeling of austerity is likely to 
continue for some time to come. Chart 16.
Chart 16: UK real and nominal pay growth since 2007
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Chart 17: UK Services, Construction and Manufacturing PMI
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Chart 18: Surveys of capacity pressures
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Chart 19: CFO Business Uncertainty since 2013
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Faced with an ongoing squeeze, it is no surprise 
that borrowing amongst households is on the rise 
once again. At the same time, the UK savings ratio 
continues to remain close to record lows.  
Most up to date business surveys point to growth 
continuing, but at a slow pace. 
The UK manufacturing PMI fell to just 51.1 in 
October (well below market expectations and well 
above 50 marks expansion). UK services PMI also 
fell to 52.2. Chart 17. 
The CBIs Business Optimism indicator decreased 
to -16 for Q4 2018, the lowest reading since 
immediately after the EU referendum. 
At the heart of the slowdown in business activity is a 
IDOORŎLQLQYHVWPHQW
1RYHPEHUöV%DQNRI(QJODQG,QŐDWLRQ5HSRUWIRXQG
that, for Q3 2018, Brexit uncertainty was the single 
largest factor weighting on investment plans. Chart 
18. Other measures, such as Deloittes CFO survey, 
have also found evidence of rising uncertainty. Chart 
19. 
2IFRXUVHKRZWKLVDŎHFWVGLŎHUHQWSDUWVRIWKH8.
will vary. 
New work by researchers at the University of 
Strathclyde  as part of the Economics Statistics 
Centre of Excellence (ESCOE)  shows that the 
economic gap between the south and north of 
England has widened since the referendum. Chart 
20.
$IWHUDGMXVWLQJIRULQŐDWLRQ/RQGRQöVHFRQRP\
is roughly 5% bigger than it was in June 2016 
compared to growth of only 1.3% in the North East. 
Chart 20: Nowcasts of UK regional growth, year to Q3 2018
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Chart 21: GDP per capita in Scotland and the UK, Q1 1999 = 100
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Chart 22: Sector contributions to annual GDP growth, %, Q2 
2018 on Q2 2017
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Chart 23: Contribution of expenditure components to nominal 
GDP, Q1 2017 - Q2 2018
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The Scottish economy
After a sustained period of weak growth, the Scottish 
economy has been showing signs of strengthening. 
Growth has picked up and employment remains 
at relatively high levels. This has been a positive 
turnaround on twelve months ago. 
Growth over the year to June 2018 was the fastest 
since late 2014/ early 2015, with the Scottish 
economy outpacing the UK for the last two quarters. 
That being said, annual growth of 1.7% (quarter-to 
quarter) and 1.4% (4Q-on-4Q), still lags Scotlands 
long-term historical growth rates.
At the same time, much of the pick-up in recent 
WLPHVDUJXDEO\UHŐHFWVDGHJUHHRIõFDWFKXSöDIWHUD
challenging period for the Scottish economy. 
As Chart 21 highlights, since late 2014 the Scottish 
economy has been lagging behind the rest of the UK. 
The last six months have at least helped to stop this 
trend. 
Overall, the upturn has been relatively broad-based.
Over Q2, there was growth of 0.6% in production 
activities, 1.8% in construction and 0.4% in 
services. 
With services making up over 75% of activity  it is 
no surprise that Scotlands overall rate of growth has 
been shaped by services. Chart 22. 
The pick-up in Scottish exports continues, with 
international exports increasing by almost 10% over 
the last year. 
With imports growing only 3% in value, this has 
FRQWULEXWHGVLJQLŏFDQWO\WRQRPLQDO*3'JURZWKRYHU
the last year. Chart 23.
This currently means that, in the latest quarter, 
Scotland has a positive trade balance with the rest 
RIWKHZRUOGRŎVHWWLQJDODUJHGHŏFLWZLWKWKHUHVW
of the UK. 
In our report, Scotland 2050, we discuss Scotlands 
wider long-term export challenge and our gap in 
performance with the best performing countries. 
We highlight the importance in taking advantage of 
WKHVLJQLŏFDQWJOREDORSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWDUHRSHQWR
WKH6FRWWLVKŏUPV
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Chart 24: Scottish and UK economic performance since the 
financial crisis
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Chart 25: Scottish recession during the financial crisis - the 
impact of data revisions (date estimates were published)
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Chart 26: Scotlands construction sector since financial crisis
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The Scottish economy ten years after the 
ŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
It is 10 years since Scotland  like many other parts 
of the world  slipped into recession as the global 
ŏQDQFLDOV\VWHPJURXQGWRDKDOW
A decade later, how have we fared? 
7KHŏQDQFLDOFULVLVZLSHGDURXQGRIRXWSXWIURP
the Scottish economy. UK output fell by over 6%. 
Chart 24. Interestingly however, the scale of the 
downturn is now believed to have been much less 
óDURXQGVPDOOHUóWKDQŏUVWPHDVXUHGDWWKH
time at the height of the crisis. Chart 25.
Instead, what has been particularly challenging for 
Scotland has been the weak recovery.  It took around 
ŏYH\HDUVIRURXWSXWWRUHWXUQWRLWVSUHFULVLVOHYHOLQ
Scotland.
Chart 24 also shows that whilst the UK economy 
VXŎHUHGDGHHSHUUHFHVVLRQWKDQ6FRWODQGGULYHQE\
a sharper fall in services), it performed better in the 
recovery period.
Today, GDP per head in Scotland is 1.7 per cent 
greater than it was 10 years ago. To put that in 
context, average annual growth in the preceding 10 
years was 1.9% per annum.  
The impact of the crisis varied by sector.
Unsurprisingly, construction bore the brunt of the 
downturn  contracting by over 20%. According 
to the newly revised data from the Scottish 
Government, the sector in Scotland around the same 
level as it was 10 years ago. Chart 26.
Chart 27: Volume of residential property sales in Scotland per 
year, Q2 2003 - Q2 2018 
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Scottish Economy Dashboard
Agriculture
% of  
Economy 2017 Q2 2018
Growth
Construction
 Ł Uplift in public sector capital investment should help 
support infrastructure, but wider measures of activity 
 including commercial property and house-building  
remain relatively subdued
 Ł Grew strongly in 2017 but performance in the last four 
quarters has been relatively poor
 Ł Sector is arguably most exposed to any hit to migration 
post-Brexit
 Ł Sector will need clarity on support, opportunities and 
regulation post-Brexit to ensure growth can continue
Services
Retail and 
wholesale
Accommodation  
& food services
Financial & 
insurance
76%
10%
3% 
6%
1.0%
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0.2% 
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1.2%
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2.5%
 
 Ł The most recent data suggests a modest upturn in retail 
and wholesale combined after a challenging start to 2018
 Ł But retail data suggests tough trading conditions, with 
PDQ\KLJKSURŏOHQDPHVRQWKHKLJKVWUHHWVWUXJJOLQJ
 Ł Rising wages could give some respite to a sector going 
WKURXJKVLJQLŏFDQWVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJH
 Ł Modest growth over the year, but some fall-back in the 
most recent quarter
 Ł Like retail, many eating establishments are facing 
challenges. Changes in how households consume 
entertainment is impacting many business models
 Ł Tourist facing elements of sector continue to do well
 Ł Sector has seen strong growth recently after a tough 2017
 Ł 8QOLNHRWKHUVHFWRUVGLUHFWO\H[SRVHGWRWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
óVXFKDVSURIHVVLRQDOVHUYLFHVDQGUHDOHVWDWHóŏQDQFLDO
services has taken much longer to get back on its feet and 
remains below pre-crisis highs
Production
Manufacturing
Food and drink
17%
11%
3%
2.0%
1.6%
-0.8%
0.3%
0.8%
3.8%
 Ł  &RQŏGHQFHDQGJURZWKKDVUHWXUQHGUHFHQWO\,QSDUWLFXODU
growth in computer products, food and drink, and textiles
 Ł ([SRUWHUVFRQWLQXHWREHQHŏWIURPZHDNSRXQG%XWIDOOLQ
oil price, and slow down in export markets is a challenge. 
At risk from dislocation of UK-EU trade
Key issues/trends
6%
1%
4.4%
4.6%
1.9%
-1.4%
 Ł  Sector continues to grow strongly  and is now at its 
highest ever level
 Ł Growth potential is high, although boosting productivity in 
sector will be key for sustainability
 Ł Future post-Brexit challenges could include just-in-time 
deliveries and access to migrant workers
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Chart 28: Services and financial services since the 2008 
financial crisis, 2000 = 100
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Chart 29: Performance of average real wages across the G7 
since the financial crisis, 2007 = 100
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Chart 30: Relative poverty in Scotland (before and after housing 
costs)
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The housing market has also yet to fully recover to 
SUHŏQDQFLDOFULVLVOHYHOVRIDFWLYLW\&KDUW
Overall, services fared better. Output only fell by 1.6 
SHUFHQW8QVXUSULVLQJO\ŏQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVRXWSXW
fell sharply (by around 12%). It is still over 7% 
smaller than its pre-crisis level. Chart 28.
Interestingly however, it has adjusted to a 
PRUHõQRUPDOöVL]HZKLFKSHUKDSVUHŐHFWVKRZ
unsustainable the good times were but also the 
underlying resilience of the (non-banking) sector 
since.
A key concern from past recessions was that 
XQHPSOR\PHQWFRXOGULVHVLJQLŏFDQWO\+RZHYHU
whilst unemployment did rise (peaking at 8.9% in 
2010), it has since fallen back. 
But earnings have lagged behind for much of the 
decade. Indeed, earnings growth in the UK has been 
WKHZHDNHVWLQWKH*VLQFHWKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV
Chart 29. 
According to the Scottish Fiscal Commission, real 
household incomes per head are on track to remain 
EHORZWKHLUSUHŏQDQFLDOFULVLVOHYHOVHYHQE\
Poverty levels in Scotland have, as a result, 
remained stubbornly high. Chart 30. around 
1 million people are estimated to be living in 
KRXVHKROGVFODVVLŏHGDVLQõUHODWLYHSRYHUW\öó
including 1 in 4 children. 
The key reason for weak earnings growth has 
undoubtedly been the poor performance of 
productivity.
Had the pre-2006 trend continued, productivity in 
Scotland would be around 15% higher than it is 
today. Chart 31.
Chart 31: Scotlands long-term productivity performance
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Chart 32: Scottish employment & unemployment rate
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Chart 33: Unemployment rate by different part of the UK
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Chart 34: Scottish employment & self-employment
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Scottish labour market
Scotlands labour market continues to experience 
a period of historically low unemployment and high 
employment.
Scotlands headline unemployment rate is now 
3.8%, its lowest recorded rate, with an employment 
rate of 75%. Chart 32.
Overall, Scotlands unemployment rate is one of the 
lowest in the UK. Chart 33. However, unlike in the 
rest of the UK, inactivity has risen in Scotland over 
the last year  up 0.4% points compared to a fall of 
0.4% points in the UK. 
This might not all be bad news however, as the 
largest increase has been amongst those aged 
óZLWKVRPHRIWKLVOLNHO\WRUHŐHFWLQFUHDVHG
student numbers. 
In contrast to the past couple of years, the 
balance of employment in Scotland between self-
employment and employee jobs appears to be 
shifting back towards employees. 
This suggests that the substantial rises in self-
employment witnessed since the Great Recession 
may have eased somewhat. Chart 34.
At the same time, the number of people in part-time 
ZRUNZKRDUHVHHNLQJóEXWFDQQRWŏQGóIXOOWLPH
work continues to fall. Chart 35. 
The ageing of Scotlands labour force continues 
apace. 
Chart 35: Percentage of part-time workers who cannot find full-
time work, Jan-Dec 2004 up to Jul 2017 - Jun 2018
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Chart 36: Employment levels by age in Scotland since 2008-09
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Chart 37: Youth (16-24) employment and unemployment in 
Scotland since 2008-09
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Chart 38: Median real earnings in Scotland and UK CPI inflation
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Employment amongst those aged 65+ continues 
to rise. In contrast, there are fewer young people 
employed now than 10 years ago. 
6RPHRIWKLVUHŐHFWVIHZHU\RXQJSHRSOHLQWKH
JHQHUDOSRSXODWLRQEXWLWDOVRUHŐHFWVDORZHU\RXWK
employment rate. Chart 36. 
Whilst the headline measures of labour market 
performance might appear robust, challenges 
remain. In particular, real earnings growth (i.e. after 
DGMXVWLQJIRULQŐDWLRQLQ6FRWODQGKDVEHHQóDW
best  barely positive over the last few years. Chart 
38.
Much has been written about productivity since 
WKHŏQDQFLDOFULVLV0DQ\K\SRWKHVLVKDYHEHHQ
formulated, yet little appears to be changing in the 
headline data. Chart 39.
In Scotland, while there has been some 
improvement in catching up with the UK over the 
ODVWGHFDGHWKLVUHŐHFWVPRUHWKHIDLOXUHRI8.
productivity than any particularly turnaround in 
Scotland. 
The last few quarters have produced better rates of 
productivity growth, but overall, productivity has 
barely moved since 2010/11.
A recent report from Deloitte UK on productivity 
in UKs Nations and Regions concludes that 
Scotland needs more businesses of scale that 
are competitively positioned across international 
markets as well as support in the development 
RIOHDGHUVKLSVNLOOVDQGFRQŏGHQFHWRHQWHUDQG
succeed in export.
Chart 39: Scottish GVA per hour
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Chart 40: Scottish hours worked, GDP and labour productivity
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Chart 41: Productivity across countries, Denmark = 100, 
purchasing power adjusted GDP per hour, 2014
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Chart 42: Scotlands relative productivity performance, by key driver, Denmark = 100, 2014
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7KHSUHŏQDQFLDOFULVLVWUHQGRIVXVWDLQHG
productivity growth is no longer a given  temporary 
periods of growth have been eroded by stronger 
growth in the number of hours worked. Chart 40.
New research by Edinburgh University academics 
5REHUW=\PHNDQG0DUN0LWFKHOORŎHUVQHZLQVLJKWV
on Scotlands recent productivity performance. Chart 
41. 
Using novel methods, they show that the 
productivity gap with the OECDs top performers can 
be attributed to a low capital stock per worker, and 
low Total Factor Productivity. Chart 42.
The former refers to the level of investment in 
machinery, equipment and infrastructure. The latter 
WRWKHHőFLHQF\ZLWKZKLFKDQHFRQRP\FRPELQHV
its productive resources to grow its economy. 
:KLOVW6FRWODQGEHQHŏWVIURPUHODWLYHO\KLJK
workforce skills and relatively terms of trade, this 
LVLQVXőFLHQWWRRŎVHWWKLVZHDNHUSHUIRUPDQFH
elsewhere.
This suggests that solutions for Scotland should 
focus upon boosting investment  both public 
and private  and focussing upon the quality of 
PDQDJHPHQWZLWKLQŏUPVWKHQHHGWRWDFNOHWKH
SUHYDOHQFHRIVPDOODQGOHVVHőFLHQWŏUPVDQG
demographic factors (such as population age) which 
may be possible culprits for Scotlands low TFP.
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Chart 43: FAI/RBS Business Activity Index, 2008 - Expected Q4 
2018
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Table 4: FAI/RBS Business Monitor key indicators, Q3 2018
Q3 
2018
Quarterly 
change
12 month 
change
3 year 
average
Business volume (net balance)
New business +16% +7 +4 +17
Repeat business +10% +10 +9 +2
Business concerns (%)
Weakening demand - important 77% -5 -1 -4
Exchange rates - important 53% +1 -3 +3
Investment (net balance)
Capital investment -11% -5 -3 -8
Leasing -24% 0 0 -20
Source: FAI-RBS Business Monitor
Chart 44: RBS UK regional PMI, Jan 2016 - Oct 2018
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Latest Scottish indicators
Business Sentiment indicators for Scotland continue 
to show a generally positive picture. 
Our FAI/RBS Business Activity Index shows the 
expectations for Q4 to be fairly buoyant, following 
a strong Q3  Chart 43. The main areas of concern 
remain around investment, as decisions are delayed 
due to wider economic uncertainty. Table 4.
The RBS regional PMI shows that the sentiment in 
Scotland is in positive territory, on a par with the UK 
as a whole. Chart 44.
7KHUHWDLOVHFWRULQ6FRWODQGKDVKDGDGLőFXOW
period over the last year or so, with quarterly growth 
lagging the UK. Chart 45.
Indeed, the volume of retail activity over the last 
year in Scotland has grown by 1.3%, compared to 
3.4% in the UK. 
It is large retailers (those with 250+ employees) in 
6FRWODQGWKDWVHHPWREHVXŎHULQJWKHPRVW9ROXPH
RIEXVLQHVVLQUHWDLOKDVUHPDLQHGŐDWRYHUWKH
last year for these larger retailers, and has in fact 
contracted in the latest quarter. 
This compares with healthy growth for smaller 
retailers that is more similar to the overall UK 
picture.
Chart 45: Quarterly retail sales growth in Scotland and GB since 
2016
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Chart 46: Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment Index 
current conditions, Q2 2013 - Q3 2018
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Chart 47: Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment Index 
expectations of the Scottish economy, Q2 2013 - Q3 2018
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Chart 48: GfK Scottish Consumer Confidence Index, Jan 1997 - 
Nov 2018
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,QFRQWUDVWWREXVLQHVVVHQWLPHQWWKHFRQŏGHQFH
of consumers is much more subdued. The outlook 
for the Scottish Economy, household spending and 
ŏQDQFHVDUHDOOLQQHJDWLYHWHUULWRU\&KDUW
Looking in detail at consumer expectations for the 
Scottish economy, the trend since 2015 has been 
that fewer people think the economy is getting 
better, and more people think the economy is 
getting worse overall. Chart 47.
7KLVZRXOGFKLPHZLWKWKHRőFLDOGDWDRQWKH
Scottish economy, insofar as the gap between 
Scottish and UK GDP per head has widened and then 
persisted over recent years.
7KH8.&RQVXPHU&RQŏGHQFH%DURPHWHULV
conducted by GfK on behalf of the EU, with similar 
surveys being conducted in each European country. 
The current survey was carried out in early November 
7KLVFROOHFWVYLHZVRQSHUVRQDOŏQDQFHV
general economic conditions, views on major 
purchases and how good a time it is to save.
7KHPRVWUHFHQWŏJXUHIRU6FRWODQGLVERWKORZLQ
historical terms and compared to the UK. Indeed, 
this is the lowest value in over 4 years. Chart 48.
The outlook for the labour market remains positive. 
Most indicators - such as the RBS Jobs Barometer - 
all point to the labour market in Scotland operating 
at near capacity. Chart 49.
Chart 49: RBS Scottish Jobs Barometer index: continued high 
demand for jobs
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Table 5: Latest GDP growth forecasts and outturn
2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21
SFC (Dec 2017) 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6%
SFC (May 2018) 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9%
SG (Sep 2018) 1.3% - - -
2017 2018 2019 2020
FAI (Sept 2017) 1.2% 1.4% 1.7% -
FAI (Sept 2018) - 1.3% 1.4% 1.4%
Source: Scottish Fiscal Commission, Scottish Government & FAI analysis
Chart 50: Employment rate (16+) in Scotland and the UK
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Chart 51: Annual growth in earnings (outturn) and SFC & OBR 
forecasts
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Scottish Fiscal Commissions forecasts
Alongside the Scottish Governments Draft Budget, 
the Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) will publish 
their revised forecasts for the Scottish economy. 
We discuss the wider budget context in the Policy 
section of the Commentary. 
The SFC forecast a number of variables around their 
now twice yearly reports. This is all underpinned 
by an overall view of how they think the Scottish 
economy is faring and the outlook.
The SFC have been cautious, forecasting growth of 
less than 1% until 2022. Table 5.
So what is worth watching out for?
7KHŏUVWWKLQJWKDWWKH6)&ZLOOKDYHWRGRLVUHŐHFW
upon how their forecasts compare with the most 
recent data on Scottish GDP (in particular, the major 
revisions to the Scottish construction series). 
It is highly likely that the SFC will revise up their 
growth forecasts. However, we see little evidence 
that they will take a much more positive outlook 
WKDQLQWKHLUŏUVWWZRVHWVRIIRUHFDVWV
The second key element that they will have to 
consider is how tax rich this growth is likely to be. 
)RULQFRPHWD[WKHPRVWVLJQLŏFDQWGHYROYHG
revenue by far, the two most important elements are 
employment and earnings. 
Mirroring the trend in economic performance, 
Scotlands employment rate fell in 2016. Since then, 
employment in Scotland is now growing at the same 
rate as in the UK. Chart 50.
What about earnings? 
Chart 51 compares outturn data on average annual 
earnings in Scotland and the UK, alongside two 
recent forecasts of earnings growth from the SFC and 
OBR. 
7KHODWHVWGDWDKDVFRQŏUPHGVRPHZKDWVORZHU
growth in Scotland, consistent with the SFCs 
assessment in May. However, the good news is that 
the gap between Scotland and the UK may not be 
as large as perhaps thought.  However, it seems 
likely that the SFC will continue to forecast weaker 
earnings growth in Scotland relative to the UK as a 
whole. 
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Table 6: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy
2018 2019 2020
Bank of England 1.5% 1.8% 1.7%
OBR 1.3% 1.6% 1.4%
NIESR 1.4% 1.9% 1.6%
European Commission 1.3% 1.2% -
IMF 1.4% 1.5% 1.5%
Oxford Economics 1.3% 1.7% 2.0%
ITEM Club 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%
CBI 1.4% 1.3% -
Source: HM Treasury, Bank of England, OBR
Table 7: Bank of England projections - what could they mean for 
Scotland? (compared to the financial crisis)
GDP Unemployment House 
prices
2008-09 Financial 
Crisis
-4% +131,000 -16%
Disorderly -8% +100,000 -30%
Disruptive -3% +52,000 -14%
Economic 
partnership
-0.75% to 
+ 1.75%
+/- 2,000 N/A
Source: Bank of England, Fraser of Allander Institute 
Table 8: FAI Nowcasts for Scotlands GDP in Q3 and Q4 2018
Q3 Q4
Quarterly Growth 0.35% 0.39%
Annualised Growth 1.42% 1.57%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 52: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth range
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* Actual data to Q2 2018. Central forecast with forecast 
uncertainty for 2018  2020. Uncertainty bands sourced from 
DFFXUDF\RISDVWIRUHFDVWVDWGLŎHUHQWIRUHFDVWKRUL]RQV
Our forecasts
Economic forecasting in the current climate is 
IUDXJKWZLWKGLőFXOW\
Even in normal times, forecasting is not an exact 
science. An economy  particularly a small open one 
like Scotland  is constantly subject to events out 
with its control. This is why we are clear about the 
sensitivities of our forecasts and encourage readers 
to focus on the range of estimates. 
The unpredictability of short-term outcomes, also 
highlights why it is important  particularly from a 
policy perspective  to focus upon the long-term 
drivers of growth and prosperity. 
But the debate in Scotland on such questions 
remains weak. We have through the year pointed to 
the weaknesses in strategy and economic thinking 
within policymaking. We see little evidence of things 
having changed for the better. 
In terms of immediate prospects, Brexit remains the 
key risk factor. 
)LUVWO\QRRQHFDQSUHGLFWZLWKFRQŏGHQFHZKDW
might happen next  particularly if Parliament votes 
against the proposed withdrawal agreement. 
Secondly, there is simply no precedent for a 
no deal outcome to use as a benchmark for 
forecasting. In Box 1 we discuss the channels 
through which the economy could be impacted. 
So without any hard evidence about what might 
happen next politically, we have based our analysis 
upon a smooth transition deal. This is the approach 
taken by most other forecasters. Table 6.
The Bank of England has provided some thoughts. 
In November, they set out a series of scenarios 
covering how the UK economy may evolve in the 
event of a no deal. Table 7.
In this worst case scenario  one of a disorderly 
Brexit  the Bank believe that the UK economy could 
shrink by 8%. 
To put this in context, the Scottish economy 
FRQWUDFWHGE\MXVWXQGHUGXULQJWKHŏQDQFLDO
crisis. 
Table 8 shows our latest nowcasts. 
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Table 9:  FAI forecast Scottish GDP growth (%) 2018 to 2021
2018 2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4%
Production 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.6%
Construction 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
Services 1.2% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 10: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2021
2018 2019 2020 2021
Employee jobs 2,495,250 2,521,800 2,550,400 2,577,700
% employee job 
growth over year
1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
ILO 
unemployment
98,000 103,500 104,400 112,500
Rate (%)1 3.7% 3.9% 3.9% 4.1%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.
1 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over.
Chart 53: FAI GDP forecasts by sector, 2018  2021
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The results are consistent with our expectations for 
JURZWKLQŏUVWPDGHLQ2QEDODQFHZH
believe that  setting aside any risks from the Brexit 
negotiations going awry  Scotland should be on 
track to grow at a broadly similar rate to last year (if 
not slightly faster). Table 9.
Turning to our forecasts for the next three years, 
as in the past, we report a central forecast but also 
uncertainty bands that set out a likely range within 
which we predict Scottish economic growth will lie. 
It is important to note that such bands are based 
upon historical variations in our normal forecasting 
performance. The potential for a no deal Brexit 
outcome is clearly not a normal event and would 
VLJQLŏFDQWO\ORZHURXURXWORRNIRUJURZWK:HGR
think that the worst case scenario put forward by the 
Bank is highly unlikely, though accept growth will 
slow sharply. 
A technical recession  i.e. two or more consecutive 
quarters of falling output  whilst by no means a 
certainty, cannot be ruled out.
With nominal earnings growth expected to pick-up, 
DQGSURYLGHGWKDWWKLVRXWSDFHVLQŐDWLRQKRXVHKROG
spending should see some modest gains. 
Investment activity is likely to remain under pressure 
as Brexit-uncertainty continues to cast a shadow 
over growth ambition. But it could also be the 
element that bounces back most strongly in the 
event of a positive outcome (from the perspective of 
maintaining close ties to the EU). 
Net exports and tourism are on track to continue to 
EHQHŏWIURPWKHORZYDOXHRI6WHUOLQJ+RZHYHUWKH
softening in global growth might mean that 2019 is 
not as healthy as 2018. As in recent years, services 
should make the greatest contribution to growth. 
There is a renewed risk in manufacturing however, 
with the downturn in the price of oil likely to test 
the resilience of the oil and gas supply chain. Most 
indications are that the sector is better prepared  
than four years ago. Chart 53.
With major new public investment in the pipeline, 
the construction sector should continue to see a 
more sustained outlook. 
We expect unemployment to rise slightly toward 
a level consistent with more medium-term trends. 
Table 10.
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Box 1. No deal
Clearly the greatest risk to our forecast is the possibility of no deal.
2XURZQHVWLPDWHVVXJJHVWWKDWóRYHUWKHORQJUXQóVXFKDQRXWFRPHZRXOGDFWDVDVLJQLŏFDQWGUDJRQ
Scotlands long-term growth potential.
These estimates were obtained from what is known as a general equilibrium model of the Scottish 
economy. This however tells us little about the short-term impact of no deal.
The challenge with forecasting what a no deal might mean is the lack of any precedent to fall back on. 
6RZKLOVWZHFDQEHFRQŏGHQWWKDWDEUHDNGRZQRIWKH8.öVHFRQRPLFUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8ZLOOKDYH
VLJQLŏFDQWHFRQRPLFLPSOLFDWLRQVLWLVGLőFXOWWRDWWDFKDQH[DFWQXPEHU
The OBR and most independent forecasters have stuck to assuming that the UK and the EU will secure 
some form of deal, with a transition period. We follow that approach. 
The Bank of England in contrast, has set out a series of scenarios for what might happen, with the aim 
of stress-testing the banking system.  
Up to March 2019, if a no deal increases in probability, there are likely to be two forces at work.
Firstly, there is a series of factors that may slow the economy even further. Sterling is likely to fall, 
SXVKLQJXSLQŐDWLRQDQGUHGXFLQJUHDOZDJHV
Financial markets are likely to be volatile. Some have suggested that the UKs Credit Rating may be 
GRZQJUDGHG$OORIWKLVFRXOGOHDGWRDIXUWKHUIDOOLQEXVLQHVVDQGFRQVXPHUFRQŏGHQFHUHGXFLQJ
investment and spending.
Secondly, however, there are some forces that could boost growth. In particular, businesses and 
government may start to prepare  e.g. stockpiling and contingency planning  and this will help boost 
spending in the short-term.
One thing that can be guaranteed is that economic activity is likely to be choppy.
Post-March 2019, the outlook in the case of a no deal outcome is likely to be more negative.
Firstly, any boost from stockpiling and contingency will gradually be eroded: items stockpiled prior to no 
deal cannot be used more than once. 
Secondly, uncertainty over how long a no deal outcome could last might further dampen investment 
and spending.
7KLUGO\DQGRIFRXUVHPRVWVLJQLŏFDQWO\WKHDFWXDOEDUULHUVWKDWDõQRGHDOöRXWFRPHZRXOGFUHDWHóLQ
WHUPVRIWDULŎVFXVWRPVFRQWUROVDQGUHJXODWLRQVóZRXOGFRPHLQWRLPPHGLDWHHŎHFW7KHGLVUXSWLRQWR
H[SRUWPDUNHWVDQGVXSSO\FKDLQVóIRUVRPHóFRXOGEHVLJQLŏFDQW
Whilst it is important to remember that most UK businesses are one-step removed from international 
PDUNHWVWKHNQRFNRQHŎHFWVIURPZHDNHUJURZWKWKURXJKVXSSO\FKDLQVLVOLNHO\WREHWKHNH\DYHQXH
through which growth slows. Analysis by the Fraser of Allander Institute showed that around 130,000 
jobs are supported by EU export demand in Scotland.
Much will depend upon how the government and Bank of England respond. It is also possible that 
the UK and EU authorities (at least in the short run) would try to mitigate some of the most disruptive 
consequences of a disorderly Brexit.
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Box 1. No deal - continued
Over the next year, there are a number of planned (regular) statistical releases which will cover activity in 
the Scottish economy. These will be likely watched carefully by commentators for evidence of an impact 
of the short-term impacts of Brexit. 
In the table below, we note these, and the period of time to which these relate.
Date Data Period covered Geography
1 December 2018 GDP 2018 Q3 Scotland
2 January 2019 Retail Sales Index 2018 Q4 Scotland
3 February 2019 GDP first estimate 2018 Q4 UK
4 March 2019 GDP 2018 Q4 Scotland
5 May 2019 Retail Sales Index 2019 Q1 Scotland
6 May 2019 GDP first estimate 2019 Q1 UK
7 June 2019 GDP 2019 Q1 Scotland
8 August 2019 Retail Sales Index 2019 Q2 Scotland
9 August 2019 GDP first estimate 2019 Q2 UK
10 September 2019 GDP 2019 Q2 Scotland
11 November 2019 GDP first estimate 2019 Q3 UK
12 November 2019 Retail Sales Index 2019 Q3 Scotland
13 December 2019 GDP 2019 Q3 Scotland
,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWRőFLDOGDWDRQWKHSHULRGWKDW%UH[LWDFWXDOO\RFFXUVZLOOQRWEHDYDLODEOHXQWLO
August/September; and that data released in March will be referring to the period we are currently in 
now.  
With the departure of the UK from the EU set at the 29th of March 2019, this equates to the end of the 
ŏUVWTXDUWHU
7KLVPHDQVWKDWWKHŏUVWUHOHDVHRIHFRQRPLFVWDWLVWLFVFRYHULQJWKHSHULRGZKHQWKH8.LVQRORQJHULQ
WKH(8ZLOEHLQ$XJXVWóZLWKWKHŏUVWHVWLPDWHRI8.*'3IRUWKHQGTXDUWHURIWKH\HDUDQGWKH
Retail Sales Index for Scotland. 
The data for Scotland in 2019 Q2 will be available the following month. Only at that point will we have 
hard statistical measures of the impact on short term economic variables.
This distance between the time period and the data relating to that period means that all eyes will focus 
XSRQUHJXODUEXVLQHVVVXUYH\VóVXFKDVRXU)$,6FRWWLVK%XVLQHVV0RQLWRUóDVZHOODVøŐDVKùHVWLPDWHV
of economic activity, such as our monthly nowcasts.
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Policy context
Budget 2019/20
The Scottish budget 2019/20, which Derek MacKay 
will present to Holyrood on 12th December, will be 
the third budget of this parliamentary session.
The story of the previous two budgets has been the 
use by the Scottish Government of its new income 
tax powers to raise additional revenues from those 
with higher than average incomes. Income tax 
policy has also been the conduit through which the 
minority SNP government has leveraged political 
support for its budget from the Scottish Greens  
with the Greens securing additional revenue raising 
measures in each of the past two budgets compared 
to those the government had initially proposed.
Back at the start of the current parliamentary 
session, 2019/20 looked like it would be a 
particularly tough budget year. At the time, the 
resource block grant was due to decline by 1.4% in 
real terms, having fallen by 1.6% the previous year.
Since then, additional spending by the UK 
Government as a result of both better than forecast 
UHYHQXHVDQGVRPHUHOD[DWLRQRIŏVFDOSROLF\PHDQV
that the outlook for the block grant has improved. 
The block grant will now in fact increase very slightly 
in 2019/20, and be marginally higher than it was at 
the end of the last parliament (2016/17). Chart 54.
But the block grant is now only one part of the 
picture when it comes to the Scottish budget. The 
governments exact spending envelope in 2019/20 
will also hinge on the tax forecasts of the Scottish 
Fiscal Commission (SFC) which will be published on 
budget day (most importantly for income tax, but 
DOVRIRU/%77/DQGŏOO7D[DQG1RQ'RPHVWLF5DWHV
&ULWLFDOO\ZKDWPDWWHUVLVWKHGLŎHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH
revenue forecasts and the forecasts of the so-called 
block grant adjustments  the counterfactual 
estimates of the revenues that the UK Government 
has foregone as a result of transferring each revenue 
stream to Scotland. Where Scottish revenues are 
forecast to be higher than the corresponding BGAs 
(perhaps because of a higher tax rate in Scotland, 
or faster growth in determinants of the Scottish tax 
base, such as wages), then the Scottish budget is 
EHWWHURŎWRWKHH[WHQWRIWKLVGLŎHUHQFH
Chart 54: Scotlands resource block grant, 2016/17 - 2019/20
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In the 2018/19 budget this gap between revenues 
and BGAs was £428m in the Scottish Governments 
favour, largely because of the decisions taken on 
LQFRPHWD[+RZGLŎHUHQWPLJKWWKLVQXPEHUEHLQ
2019/20?
On the one hand, the income tax gap might be less 
VLJQLŏFDQWO\LQ6FRWODQGöVIDYRXUWKLV\HDUJLYHQWKDW
the SFC now appears to be taking a slightly dimmer 
view about the prospects for Scottish wage growth 
than it had done last December (as indicated by its 
mid-year forecasts published in May).
On the other hand, this somewhat less optimistic 
RXWORRNFRXOGEHRŎVHWE\3KLOOLS+DPPRQGöV
%XGJHWDQQRXQFHPHQWRIDVLJQLŏFDQWLQFUHDVHLQ
the Higher Rate Threshold in rUK. This tax cut for 
higher rate taxpayers will reduce the size of the 
income tax BGA, the counterfactual estimate that 
is deducted from the Scottish Governments block 
grant. Assuming the Scottish Government chooses 
not to increase the Scottish higher rate threshold 
to the same extent, it may be able to retain the gap 
between Scottish income tax revenues and the BGA 
at a similar level as last year.
Depending on which of these scenarios plays out, 
the Scottish budget could end up being about the 
same in 19/20 compared to last year, or increase 
slightly - perhaps by around 1% in real terms.
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Tax policy and the budget deal
As well as the SFCs assessment about the future 
growth of the Scottish economy and the factors 
determining Scottish revenues (such as wages, 
employment, house prices, and so on), the Scottish 
EXGJHWZLOOEHLQŐXHQFHGE\WD[SROLF\FKRLFHV
On income tax, Derek Mackay has indicated that the 
FXUUHQWŏYHEDQGWD[VWUXFWXUHZLOOUHPDLQLQSODFH
but has not ruled out changes to rates or thresholds 
within this structure. Theoretically this still leaves a 
wide range of policy options (Table 11), depending 
on how the government seeks to balance its desire 
to raise additional revenues with a preference for 
avoiding too many negative headlines about the size 
RIWD[OLDELOLW\GLŎHUHQWLDOEHWZHHQ6FRWODQGDQGU8.
These choices are likely to be most acute in relation 
to the higher rate threshold. Compared to a policy of 
LQFUHDVLQJWKHWKUHVKROGE\LQŐDWLRQ
 Ł Matching the UK threshold of £50,000 would 
cost around £280 million;
 Ł Increasing the threshold by the same 
percentage as the rUK increase in 2019/20 
would take the threshold to £46,850 and 
cost around £130 million;
 Ł Freezing the threshold in cash terms at 
£43,430 would raise an additional £60 
million for spending on public services, but 
mean that some Scottish income taxpayers 
would face an average tax rate of 1.5% higher 
than rUK counterparts. 
Table 11: Summary of income tax policy options
Static 
effect
Dynamic effect 
(including 
behavioural 
response)
1p on Basic Rate (BR) £174m £167m
1p on Intermediate Rate (IR) £133m £128m
1p on Higher Rate (HR) £83m £64m
1p on Additional Rate (AR) £22m £2m
Freeze IR threshold rather than 
increasing in line with inflation
£7m £6m
Freeze HR threshold rather than 
increase in line with inflation
£70m £64m
Increase HR threshold to 
£46,850
-£145m -£132m
Increase HR threshold to 
£50,000
-£306m -£280m
Source: FAI income tax model
As in the previous two years, parliamentary 
arithmetic means that the government will need to 
do a deal with another party to ensure it can pass 
the budget bill. If, as in the previous two years, 
the Scottish Greens are budget kingmakers, large 
increases in the higher rate threshold seem unlikely 
in practice. One hypothesis is that the draft budget 
will propose a moderate real terms increase in the 
threshold, in anticipation of it being negotiated back 
towards the existing level as part of the budget deal.
Alternatively, perhaps 2019/20 will be the year 
that the higher rate threshold ceases to be the 
cornerstone of the budget deal. Earlier this year the 
leader of the Scottish Greens Patrick Harvie wrote 
to Nicola Sturgeon to point out that progress on 
local tax reform would be the partys next area of 
constructive challenge when it came to negotiating 
a budget deal in 2019/20.
In this context, progress on local tax reform could 
be seen to encompass a range of possibilities, 
including moves toward reform of council tax and 
non-domestic rates, and allowing local authorities 
WRKDYHJUHDWHUŏVFDODXWRQRP\LQDUDQJHRIH[LVWLQJ
and new areas, potentially including through the 
enabling of new taxes at local level  such as visitor 
taxes or environmental levies.
Spending choices
So whilst there remains some uncertainty 
around the size of the budget and the Scottish 
Governments tax policies, there is perhaps a 
little more certainty on the broad direction of the 
spending choices that the government is likely to 
take.
We know for example that the Scottish Government 
will pass on recently announced health 
consequentials from UK Government spending 
increases in England into the Scottish health 
budget. We know that the police budget will be 
protected in real terms. And we know the broad size 
of funding allocations for some of the governments 
key spending commitments on educational 
attainment, early learning and childcare, and higher 
education.
These commitments on their own account for almost 
60% of the governments resource budget. Real 
terms increases in health spending, which are likely 
to be around 2.4% in 2019/20, constrain other 
parts of the budget given the dominance of health 
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spending as a share of the budget. Even if the total 
budget increases by one or even two per cent, most 
other portfolios that account for the remaining 40% 
of spending are likely to see declining real terms 
settlements.
(YHQGXULQJWKHFRXUVHRIWKHŏUVWWZREXGJHWV
of this parliament, substantial variation in the 
ŏQDQFLDOIRUWXQHVRIGLŎHUHQWSXEOLFERGLHVFDQEH
observed. The core local government settlement 
has fallen by almost 3% between 2016/17 (the 
last budget set by the previous parliament) and 
2018/19. The budget allocation to higher education 
has fallen by almost 4%, despite it being one 
of the governments spending commitments. 
Environmental organisations such as SEPA, SNH and 
Zero Waste Scotland have seen budget reductions 
between 2016/17 and 2018/19 of 6.7%, 8%, and 
3.6% respectively.
Over time, the Scottish budget is undergoing a 
radical change in its make-up. The prioritisation 
of the health budget in particular represents the 
continuation of a longer term trend. Spending on 
health, which was 38% as a share of the Scottish 
budget in 1999 had reached 47% by 2018/19, 
and could feasibly account for half of government 
resource spending by the time Holyrood debates the 
ŏQDOEXGJHWRIWKLVSDUOLDPHQWDU\VHVVLRQ&KDUW
Chart 55: Health spending in Scotland
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Local government has seen its core resource 
settlement from government fall by around 8% 
in real terms between 2010/11 and 2018/19. 
Its response has been to prioritise spending on 
statutory areas of social work and education. As a 
consequence, spending on these areas has fallen 
only slightly, whilst spending on some non-statutory 
areas including cultural and recreational services, 
and planning and economic development, has fallen 
by over 20%. Chart 56.
Chart 56: Index of real terms changes in local government 
outturn expenditure by service area, 2010/11  2017/18
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As ever, it remains unclear to what extent these 
VSHQGLQJFKDQJHVPLJKWDŎHFWRXWFRPHVZKHWKHU
economic, environmental or social. But the long-
term concentration of public sector spending 
towards health, social care and (to a lesser extent) 
education  at the expense of many areas of 
cultural, economic and environmental areas - is 
clear.
Looking beyond 2019/20
,WLVZRUWKEULHŐ\ORRNLQJEH\RQGWR
FRQVLGHUWKHFKDOOHQJHVOXUNLQJDKHDGIRUWKHŏQDO
two budgets of the parliament.
Budget 2020/21 looks ominously complicated 
compared to budget 2019/20. In principal, 2020/21 
will see assigned VAT start to contribute to the 
Scottish budget, and around £1bn of social security 
spending will be added to the budget. At the same 
WLPHZLOOEHWKHŏUVW\HDURILQFRPHWD[
reconciliation  where the budget will be adjusted 
to account for any forecast error in relation to the 
2017/18 income tax forecast.
Budget 2021/22 will be the last budget set in this 
parliament before the Holyrood elections in May 
2021. A further £2bn of social security spending will 
come on stream. 
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Parliamentary debates on this budget will potentially 
straddle the period during which the UK exits its 
transitionary arrangement with the EU.
In some ways therefore, compared to the likely 
backdrop to the next two years budgets, the 
2019/20 budget looks relatively unexciting; 
arguably a typical backdrop to a mid-term budget.
But the 2019/20 budget could yet be blown 
RŎFRXUVH:HVWPLQVWHULVH[SHFWHGWRKDYHLWV
meaningful vote on the Withdrawal Agreement 
on the 11th December, the day before the Scottish 
budget is presented.
If MPs back the Agreement, the UK will in principle 
slide smoothly out of the EU at the end of March 
2019 straight into a transitionary period. In principle 
this should leave Mr Mackays spending plans (and 
the SFC forecasts) relatively unscathed, and lay the 
way for the UK Government to go forward with its 
planned spending review later in 2019.
If however parliament rejects the proposed 
Withdrawal Agreement  which is arguably the more 
likely outcome as things stand  then the possible 
scenarios range from the UK exiting the EU with 
no agreement in March next year, through to some 
combination of Article 50 extension, renegotiation 
of the Withdrawal Agreement, a general election 
and/or a second EU referendum.
4XLWHKRZWKHEXGJHWPLJKWEHDŎHFWHG
by such events is unclear, but there could be 
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH8.ŏVFDOSODQVLQŐXHQFLQJ
the Scottish budget via the Barnett formula), and 
potentially substantial changes in tax forecasts.
One thing that is clear is that, during the next two 
months of budget debate and negotiations, the 
6FRWWLVKEXGJHWZLOOQRGRXEWSOD\VHFRQGŏGGOHWR
Brexit as a news story. 
But we should not forget the importance of the 
budget statement, not only because it determines 
how much income and council tax we pay next year, 
but more fundamentally because of what it will tell 
us about the long term trends of public spending 
LQGLŎHUHQWVSKHUHVRISXEOLFSROLF\LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ
Scotland.
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